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Abstract
Improved management of safety during procurement of
computer-based safety-critical systems is one of the key
concerns of the Australian Government’s Department of
Defence Software Acquisition Reform program. This
paper reports some lessons learnt from a task currently
being undertaken by the Defence Acquisition
Organisation, Defence Science Technology Organisation
(DSTO) and the Software Verification Research Centre
(SVRC) to study management of safety and
implementation of software safety standards in a range of
defence projects. Effective safety management requires
the identification of potential issues, and planning for
their resolution, early in the procurement process. The
lessons learnt are general and may be of benefit to other
organisations involved in specification and acquisition of
safety-critical software systems.
1.
 
Introduction
1.1 Defence acquisition reform and safety
As part of the Department of Defence’s Software
Acquisition Reform program, the SVRC and DSTO are
undertaking a number of tasks in support of the
acquisition of computer-based Safety-Critical Systems.
The project (known as ‘DefSafe’) aims to improve
Defence acquisition processes through a mix of research,
project-based consultancy and policy guidance.
Advice to defence projects is an important part of
DefSafe. Projects with which we have been involved
include: a ship-launched missile-decoy system, a digital
display system for fighter training aircraft, an air-combat
training system and a ship command-and-control system.
(This paper will not address details of specific projects).
Many projects are at an early stage of procurement, while
others have already undergone substantial development
but a detailed safety case has not yet been formulated.
Advice to projects covers the use of safety standards, the
safety management process, preliminary hazard analysis
and so on.
Policy advice is centred on an extensive survey of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of international safety
standards and a companion study of how Defence
currently invokes standards in its existing contracts. The
DefSafe team is also providing advice to Defence on the
general approach to procurement and on certification and
regulation issues.
The research aspects of the DefSafe Project are
focused on further development of the Australian
Standard DEF (AUST) 5679 [1], written by DSTO and
recently published by the Army Engineering Agency. This
Standard provides requirements and guidance for the
development and assessment of safety-critical computer-
based systems, focusing on requirements for the system
safety case. Under DefSafe, research will be carried out
into a number of technical issues, including the impact of
human factors on safety and the integration of
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) items and other non-
development items into safety-critical systems.
1.2 Lessons learnt
The work presented in this paper draws on DefSafe
experiences and observation of overseas (primarily US
and UK) defence practices. It reinforces our previous
experiences with the implementation of safety programs
across a range of different industries.
Many different technical and management issues can
affect the success of a project’s safety program.  Perhaps
the most important issue is the timely recognition of
possible safety implications of the system under
procurement – be they possible hazards for operators,
other defence staff, allies, or even civilians. These safety
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often, safety is considered only late in the procurement
lifecycle, by which time it may be too late, or too
expensive, to implement effective risk mitigations. This
often results in sacrifice of system functionality or
imposition of undesirable operational constraints.
This paper presents some of the issues that we have
observed in the implementation of safety programs across
a broad range of defence projects, at different stages of
the development lifecycle.  Some of the issues have well-
known solutions while others are symptoms of the
inherent difficulty of analysing, designing, implementing
and assuring safe computer-based systems.  In any case, it
is hoped that other projects – in defence and other
application domains – can benefit from the mistakes of the
past by taking timely and appropriate management action.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses
issues that arise in the choice of safety standards to be
applied to a project. Section 3 describes issues for the
safety management process, and discusses the regulatory
and certification context. Section 4 discusses safety
management issues, including procurement processes and
capabilities. Section 5 describes technical factors that are
known to cause difficulties in safety management. Section
6 presents a checklist of issues for consideration in early
phases of the procurement lifecycle.  Finally, Section 7
presents a summary and conclusions.
2. Choice of safety standards
In a sense, existing Safety standards embody ‘best
practice’ in safety management, yet the range of available
safety standards is potentially very confusing, and
choosing the best standard for a particular project can be
difficult. Here we present some relevant background, then
some observations about the choice of safety standards for
safety-critical computer-based Defence systems.
2.1 International trends
The SVRC has carried out an extensive survey of
international safety standards [2], drawing on existing
surveys [3], [4], covering the following standards:
• DEF (AUST) 5679 [1]
• MIL-STD-882C [5]
• NATO StanAgs 4404 [6]and 4452 [7]
• UK Defence Standards 00-54 [8], 00-55 [9] and
00-56 [10]
• ARP Standards 4754 [11] and 4761 [12]
• RTCA/DO-178B [13]
• IEC 61508 [14]
There are some clear trends emerging in these
standards.
The system nature of safety is clearly recognised.
Moreover, standards are now addressing the whole system
lifecycle, from concept through to decommissioning. In
many cases (such as MIL-STD-882C), there is a
broadening of definition of safety so that it covers not
simply “life and limb” but includes also equipment
damage and threats to the environment.
The concept of a Safety Case is central in many safety
standards. A Safety Case documents the evidence
providing assurance that the system will be safe to
operate, and assumptions on which the assurance is based
[15], [16].
Emphasis in the past has often been on documenting
the quality of the engineering process, but certifiers
increasingly require also “product” assurance – details of
safety features of the design and evidence of their
effectiveness. For example, the UK Ministry of Defence’s
flight certification authorities focus entirely on product
evidence. At the very least, the safety case needs to
contain sufficient details of design and identification of
safety mechanisms for an independent safety assessment
to be made (“transferable assurance”).
Standards are increasingly recognising the inherent
difficulty of assuring the safety of software-based systems,
and encourage system engineers to consider other (simpler
or more reliable) means of implementing safety-critical
functionality. Standards that address software safety are
now deliberately moving away from the use of
quantitative (probabilistic) risk assessment in favour of
qualitative analysis and evidence of good design practices.
2.2 Defence use of standards
A number of safety standards are used in Defence
projects: projects that we are aware of have invoked one
or more of the following standards: MIL STDs 882B and
882C, UK Defence Standards 00-55 and 00-56, RTCA
DO-178B, DEF (AUST) 5679, and StanAgs 4404 and
4452. Publication of the use of standards is limited [17].
In some cases, standards have been invoked that do not
provide sufficient coverage of safety aspects, while in
other projects no specific safety standards are used.
Clearly, the approach to procurement of Defence
systems within Australia is not a uniform one as far as
safety standards are concerned. Special problems can arise
where multiple standards are invoked, because of the
difficulty in reconciling what can be vastly different
approaches to safety management.
33. Safety management framework
Standards alone are not adequate to provide assurance
of safety: there needs to be in place an appropriate cross-
organisational management framework for safety [18]. We
make various observations here, by way of context for the
rest of the paper.
3.1 Certification and regulatory authorities
Various organisations exist with the responsibility of
certifying safety-critical systems. Within Australia, the
Australian Ordnance Council (AOC) provides advice on
the safety and suitability for service for ordnance aspects
of weapons systems in Defence. The Royal Australian
Airforce (RAAF) has a Directorate of Technical
Airworthiness, which makes recommendations on
airworthiness of piloted aircraft. In the USA, the US
Navy’s Weapons Systems Explosive Safety Review Board
(WSESRB) reviews the safety programs for weapons
systems.
In many cases, safety assessment is required prior to
acceptance into service. However, for Australian Defence
systems there are safety aspects for which no identified
authority takes responsibility (for example, for systems
outside the scope of the AOC but which are nevertheless
safety-critical). Another concern is that, where authorities’
jurisdictions overlap, inconsistencies between approaches
may result in conflicting requirements.
3.2 Through-lifecycle support
The safety program should not conclude with the
delivery of the safety case prior to system operation.
Training of system operators, maintenance, “upgrades”
and interfacing with new and evolving systems all have
possible safety implications.
Sometimes, the procured system will form part of a
wider operational system, for example upgrades to an
existing aircraft. Typical current practice is simply to
assess the “deltas”, based on an Engineering Change
Proposal. Unfortunately, this often results in an
incomplete safety case that becomes harder to maintain –
and less credible – the longer the system continues to
evolve.
As noted earlier, safety management must extend
beyond the procurement lifecycle, into operation,
maintenance and modification. These phases typically
have more Defence involvement, perhaps with some
Developer support in maintenance and modification
activities. In the future, Defence faces the challenge of
maintaining a continuous safety program throughout these
post-procurement phases.
The UK Ministry of Defence is moving towards the
creation of a single safety authority covering all forces and
both in-acquisition and in-service aspects of safety.
However, currently there is no corresponding single
authority in the Australian Department of Defence (ADF).
Despite the unique requirements of different ADF sectors,
Australia would benefit from a more coordinated
approach to safety management.
4. Project safety management
4.1 Safety Management Group
Safety management is a responsibility shared by
multiple stakeholders, including the Client, Australian
Defence Organisation, Developer and Subcontractors,
Evaluators, Certifiers and End-users.  Safety-critical
decisions require ratification from all parties, particularly
where trade-offs between cost and risk are made.
Effective safety management also requires direct access to
information and representation of diverse expertise.
Accordingly, most standards call for the establishment of
a Safety Management Group involving representatives of
all stakeholders.
Some balance must be struck between adequate
representation and a workable size.  In practice, it is likely
that a core group will make the decisions and will invite
specialist representation as appropriate.
4.2 Procurement processes and capabilities
The Client’s role in the development and maintenance
of the safety case is often downplayed or overlooked. In
the past, much of the responsibility for safety engineering
has rested with the Developer.  However, it is increasingly
recognised that Defence has a role to play in safety
management.
There may be parts of the safety case that only the
Client can provide.  Client information is particularly
important in the risk analysis and assessment activities,
which typically require extensive knowledge of the system
environment and operational profile, external risk
mitigations and rationale for safety targets.
In fact, many standards require the Client to determine
risk targets and acceptability of risk. Typically this means
defining severity and likelihood categories for system
failures, and defining the levels of authorisation required
for accepting risk or approving engineering changes. DEF
(AUST) 5679 provides pre-determined risk criteria, but
other standards (e.g. MIL-STD-882) need “tailoring” by
the Client to set risk targets appropriate to the application.
Defence thus needs to have the capability to assess
safety throughout development, certainly at Preliminary
Design Review and Critical Design Review, and also prior
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to be transferred into operational support teams. Due to
lack of established expertise and experience, on-the-job
training is usually required.
4.3 Developing safety assurance
We have observed a number of different models for the
development of safety assurance.
In some (typically older) models, a separate team
(sometimes even a separate organisation) performs safety
analysis, by analogy with Independent Verification and
Validation (IVandV). This can be frustrating for the safety
analysis team, since their analysis will usually lag behind
design, and there may be little opportunity to influence
design. Conversely, designers may resent what they see as
interference, and may even take a proprietorial position
and hinder access to information by analysts.
For these reasons, there are often significant overheads,
and considerable risk of schedule delays and cost overruns
(or threat to safety integrity). A substantial problem is the
transfer of knowledge between teams, with safety analysts
missing critical design rationale and explanations, while
designers fail to benefit from the design insight gained by
analysis.
A related issue is configuration management where
design baselines stable enough for external review appear
too late in the evolutionary design process to be efficiently
modified by analysis.
We have observed that a better, more effective
approach is for the two teams to work closely together (or
better still, to have a single team) to produce a safety case
that is then evaluated by an independent third party. One
model is to distribute responsibility of safety analysis and
assurance across design teams, with the “safety
management team” simply responsible for coordination
and quality control.
4.4 Independent safety assessment
For complex or innovative system designs, certification
and regulatory authorities generally rely on an
independent technical assessment of the safety case.
Indeed, many standards explicitly require this, for
example the Evaluator role in DEF (AUST) 5679.
Depending on the standard used, the requirement for
independent assessment may range from a peer review
within the design team to a review by a separate
organisation.
Criteria for independence include financial and
management autonomy. This may present problems in a
relatively small software system safety community such as
exists in Australia. There is frequently a need to put
“Chinese walls” in place and to ensure possible conflicts
of interest are declared.
The argument for independence is that an independent
Evaluator may discover anomalies overlooked by those
more familiar with the problem, and that their opinions are
less likely to be distorted by other project goals. This
means the Evaluator should have limited involvement in
decision-making or design but should instead review and
assess the result of such decisions.
The extent of assessment effort may range from an
audit of processes to a full technical review of program
outputs. In some instances, it may also include elements of
the safety analysis itself.
5.
 
Technical issues
This paper largely focuses on management issues in
procurement of safety-critical systems, but certain
technical issues can severely impact a safety program. In
part, the issues reflect a general lack of consensus on
certain aspects of safety assurance. However, through
early identification of possible pitfalls, it may be possible
to minimise the possible disruption that these technical
issues have on the safety program.
5.1 Process versus product assurance
Many safety standards, following recent trends in
quality assurance, prescribe processes to follow in the
construction of a safety-critical system in the belief that
executing the processes will generate a high integrity
product. While there is a broad consensus about the
correlation between process and product quality, safety-
critical systems additionally require product-based
evidence of safety. However, all too often  inadequate or
inappropriately detailed design information is made
available to assessors, resulting in lower assurance than
appropriate.
It is necessary to plan a technical argument to present
in the safety case based on product assurance. Such an
argument will also assist the planning and coordination of
the safety program by allowing the results of assurance
processes to be focussed on well-understood goals.
5.2 Use of COTS components and reuse
Safety integrity of “Commercial Off the Shelf” (COTS)
components is a particularly difficult issue. Sometimes
COTS products can be acquired along with evidence of
assurance. However, this evidence must be shown to be
applicable under the demands of the new operational
environment and the regulatory expectations. If
appropriate assurance cannot be acquired, the costs
involved in “reverse engineering” a safety case for COTS,
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component upgrades, can outweigh the potential savings
of off-the-shelf procurement [19]. A similar consideration
applies to reuse of components or software platforms. At
present, there are very few cost-effective methods of
providing assurance of COTs in safety-critical systems.
5.3 Safety Integrity Levels as a sticking point
Most safety standards employ a notion of Safety
Integrity Levels (SILs) – sometimes called Development
Assurance Levels – to categorise the level of safety
assurance required for a system, subsystem or component
according to their criticality to safety. The level of
assurance is typically defined by the degree of rigour and
independence applied during analysis, design,
implementation and testing.
Although SILs are an intuitively appealing notion, they
are surprisingly difficult to make precise and different
standards use different definitions. This can present
significant difficulties in combining the use of different
standards, or in integrating systems whose components
were developed against different standards [20].
The use of SILs also complicates the process of
software development planning and cost estimation. One
difficulty is that required integrity levels are not firmly
known until the system design and safety analysis is in
place. However, software development must be costed
and planned long before this time. The general solution to
this problem we have observed is to plan software
development based on assumptions of required integrity
levels. Such assumptions may even be formalised in the
contract. Subsequent design effort may then reduce the
required software integrity to feasible levels. If such
decisions are not made prior to the contract, it may
become necessary to seek consensus from all stakeholders
early (including the Evaluator) to “make the best guess
and proceed”.
Even if the required integrity level is known, the cost
of achieving ultra-high integrity is not currently possible
to predict and, in some cases, may be prohibitively high.
The assurance techniques required will generally
challenge Developer’s capabilities and may require
substantial modifications to familiar development
processes.
To some extent, this is a deliberate act by Certifiers in
order to make Developers think twice before
implementing critical functions in software. In practice,
we can expect to see arguments for reducing SILs, but
validity of arguments needs careful examination.
5.4 Balance between testing and analysis
Although most standards highlight the need to generate
safety assurance through both analysis and testing,
traditional verification processes are often focussed on test
activities. There are a number of dangers with this
approach.
First and foremost, in many cases the attention paid to
identification of safety requirements and safety integrity
levels is not sufficiently thorough, or is performed late in
development. Careful analysis is needed early in
development, so that safety can be designed into the
system.
For safety-critical systems it is necessary to validate
their safe operation even in the presence of failures. This
means being able to inject faults and simulate failure
scenarios that may be difficult or even impossible by
testing alone. System modelling and analysis can be used
to explore scenarios that are too difficult or expensive to
construct in the test lab [18].
A balance of analysis and testing may also be
necessary for cost optimisation. Implementing test criteria
for safety-critical software can be very expensive, for
example the Modified Condition/Multiple Decision
testing of RTCA/DO-178B. Exhaustive testing is also
prohibitive and is not generally achievable in practice, for
all but the simplest of components. Software safety
analysis can reduce the cost of rigorous testing by
identifying critical software components, which demand
the most attention, and presenting scenarios as the basis of
more intelligent test cases.
Software is typically changing substantially throughout
development due to the evolution of requirements and
design solutions, and large amounts of testing are also
very expensive to repeat in the face of change. Safety
analysis can assist the regression testing process by
identifying the potential scope of the assurance through
knowledge of causal relationships between software
elements.
5.5 Technical infrastructure
The following processes are essential for safety
management, and should be established early in
development.  Ideally, solutions will be determined prior
to contract signature.
• Configuration Management, not just of software
and hardware, but also of designs and
documentation, tools and test rigs, and all the other
artefacts involved in the construction and
maintenance of the safety case.  The configuration
management system should allow for the
6identification of safety-critical system elements
and their relationship.
• Safety Incident Reporting and integration into
Engineering Change Management processes. A
means of determining the safety implications of
engineering changes and modifying safety
assurance should be identified.
• Hazard Log and Safety Data. One difficulty in
management of a safety program is coordination of
the information gathered. The Hazard Log forms
an index into the Safety Case, in essence
summarising the controllable hazard conditions,
their risks and mitigations. However, a significant
amount of other safety data is generated, through
various analyses. This information is generally
related and it often needs to be checked for
consistency and completeness [15].
The information system required to manage the
hazard log and other safety data needs forethought
to get the structuring right. Not only does all
information need to be collected concisely, but
also relationships between information should be
captured. This is especially important where
development of the safety case is distributed
across multiple organisations. It would also be
useful to integrate the safety data with other
project data, such as the requirements database.
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Starting a project safety program
Many of the activities already mentioned, such as
choosing a safety standard, constituting a Safety
Management Group, defining risk tolerability and
development processes, require early attention in the
project life cycle. We have observed significant problems
arising in development and assessment due to scant
attention being paid to these activities in early stages of
procurement.
We present a checklist to consider in the project
initiation phases to manage the risk of safety programs.
The checklist is designed to create design decision-
making structures, establish a safety culture, plan an
effective safety management process and reduce
uncertainty about program scope and cost.
The suggestions are largely independent of the
standards selected, although details will change depending
on the adopted approach.
6.1 Request For Tender (RFT)
The Client has the ultimate responsibility for procuring
a safe system so must be largely responsible for
establishing a safety program.  This is achieved by setting
an appropriate priority on the safety program in the
tendering process.
There are a number of activities that should be
performed during RFT preparation:
• Appoint a Client Safety Representative.
• Determine legal and certification requirements.
• Construct a Preliminary Hazard List to gauge
criticality of the system. If necessary and possible,
revise the system concept to eliminate hazards.
• Consider the safety program scope outside of the
system to be acquired.  In particular, establish the
relationship with integrated systems and support
requirements.
• If necessary, engage specialist technical support to
prepare or review the RFT content.
The RFT should communicate safety program
requirements and seek a proposed solution for safety
management. In particular, it should:
• Define safety program requirements, including the
use of standards.
• Define all safety program deliverables and their
format.
• Require that a single contractor have primary
responsibility for execution of the safety program
(preferably the prime system contractor).
• Request a draft development or engineering plan.
• Request a draft safety management plan, including
organisational structure, roles and responsibilities
and technical processes.
• Request evidence of ability to execute safety
management plan.
• Define special software program requirements for
safety-critical software.  Include any constraints or
assumptions about the software safety integrity.
6.2 Tender response and evaluation
The tender evaluation process should consider the
ability to execute a safety program to a level
commensurate with the perceived safety risk. Specialist
technical support may again need to be engaged to assist
the evaluation.
• Ensure that the safety management plan is
compliant with RFT requirements and standards.
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and organisation is mature enough to execute the
plan.
• Ensure that the safety management plan does not
conflict with the development plan.
• Ensure the ability to apply software development
and assurance processes, especially for reused
software and COTS items.
6.3 Pre-contract activities
The best opportunity for cooperative resolution of
safety program risks is following the selection of the
preferred tenderer(s) and before contract signature.
During this period, a joint Client/Tenderer team should
competently identify and assess project risks.
Where the level of uncertainty remains high, a
recommended approach is to engage in a funded Mutual
Risk Reduction phase. This allows a Preferred Tenderer(s)
to engage in paid preliminary activity to analyse project
risk and have sound risk management process in place
once on contract. This includes those risks attached to
executing a safety program.
Since safety management is a cooperative activity, the
pre-contract phase is also an excellent opportunity to
establish working relationships and instil a cooperative
safety culture in the project.
In particular, it is useful to engage in initial workshop-
style discussions with all stakeholders to address:
• Risk assessment criteria, including levels of
tolerable risk.
• Roles and responsibilities within the safety
organisation and initiation of the Safety
Management Group.
• Procedures for risk assessment and cooperative
risk mitigation.
• The Preliminary Hazard List, including a
discussion of hazardous operational scenarios.
• Safety Management Plan and use of standards.
• Role of Evaluator or certification authority.
The information gathered by the workshop can be used
to assess the project risk associated with the safety
program. Further risk reduction can be achieved during
the Mutual Risk Reduction phase.  Activities that can be
performed during this phase include:
• Production of safety management plan.  Additional
details should include the technical solution for the
safety case and the integration of the safety
program with other activities.
Particular attention paid to relationship with
engineering activities. Influence of safety program
in review and internal authorisation procedures
and formal external reviews.
• Draft Preliminary Hazard Analysis, where the
Preliminary Hazard List is systematically refined.
An assessment of the risk based on accident
scenarios can be performed in collaboration with
the Client and Users.  This will require recording
of any operational assumptions.
Where possible, the operational concept should be
provided to the Contractor prior to Preliminary
Hazard Analysis. Alternatively, the Contractor
could be involved in the revision or development
of the concept.
• Estimation of software criticality based on results
of the Preliminary Hazard Analysis and knowledge
of system design. Particular attention should be
paid to the criticality of COTs in the design
solution.
• Planning the software development strategy to
mitigate any identified risks, possibly including a
prototype software build to refine cost estimations.
• Submission of an evaluation plan corresponding to
the Developer safety management plan.
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Summary and conclusions
We conclude with a summary of the observations and
lessons learnt in our study of processes in procurement of
safety-critical systems in Defence:
1. Just following a standard will not guarantee safety.
Domain expertise, experience and a clear
understanding of the standard’s intent are all vital.
2. A Safety Case should be required as part of system
acquisition.  The purpose of a Safety Case is to
provide transferable assurance that the system is
acceptably safe for service. Arrangements should
be made for in-service maintenance of the safety
case.
3. Cooperation from all stakeholders is required for
effective safety management. The Client (Project
Office) has primary responsibility for parts of the
Safety Case, including details of the system’s
intended operational context.
4. Development of a Safety Case is different from
IVandV, and is best integrated closely into the
system development process.
5. However there should be an independent
evaluation of the Safety Case.
6. The Safety Case should be focused on assurance
that safety requirements have been adequately
identified and addressed in design and test. In
particular, the Safety Case should include a
technically defensible argument, based on analysis
8of system design and observation of system
behaviour, that safety risks have been reduced to
acceptable levels.
7. The cost of developing and maintaining safety
assurance for COTS components may outweigh
any purported savings.
8. The project risks of developing safety-critical
software should be assessed early in the
procurement process. Particular attention should
be paid to early estimation of software integrity
targets and Developers’ capability to meet the
integrity assurance requirements.
9. Although both testing and analysis are essential,
careful attention should be paid to the most
appropriate and cost-effective balance between the
two.
10. It is highly desirable to start developing safety
arguments early in the project, so appropriate and
effective hazard mitigations can be built into the
system.
11. The safety program should be fully integrated into
development processes and infrastructure,
including the configuration management system,
incident reporting process and product information
system.
12. Risks with the safety program are best addressed
in the earliest acquisition phases, before contract
signature. If project risks are significant, it is
useful to employ a pre-contract Mutual Risk
Reduction phase, which includes a Preliminary
Hazard Analysis and early consideration of
possible risk mitigations.
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